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IV. CONCLUSION

The Adams opinion, viewed in practical terms seeks to accommodate
the positive values of free choice on the higher educational level, with the
problems attendant on the affirmative duty to desegregate. While primary
and secondary school districts have compulsory zoning laws and busing as
a means of eliminating a dual system, the appellants are allowing the noncomplying states to devise plans to allow free choice of schools. These
plans should approach desegregation on a state-by-state basis, thus allowing
great flexibility. 2" Predominantly Black institutions have demonstrated
an important role in producing graduates who take meaningful positions in
society. Adams, and Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida29 acknowledges this role of Black institutions. It is difficult to envision white institutions, in the near future, assuming similar roles. This pragmatic approach by Adams appreciates HEW's obvious difficulties in achieving
an equitable solution. The goal of having racially unidentifiable schools in
the immediate future is highly unlikely considering the fact that minority
college enrollment has decreased since 1973.30 It has been demonstrated
that the only "good education"
does not necessarily have to be an
"integrated education." '3 1
CHARLES H. HOLMES

U.S. v. Robinson : What is Reasonable?
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
provides that the people shall be protected against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and no warrants whall be issued except upon probable cause. I
However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is a long-recognized exception
to the requirement that searches must rest upon warrants issued upon
probable cause. 2 While eliminating the requirement of a warrant in some
instances the courts do require that the search be reasonable to meet the
3
safeguards of the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court of the United States, with Mr. Justice Rehnquist
writing for the majority, has further defined what it considers to be a reason28 For a cogent discussion of the inverse effects of Brown v. Board of Education, see
Howie, the Image of Black People in Brown v. Board of Education, I BLACK LAW JOURNAL
234 (1971) in which the writer maintains that Brown supports and reincarnates Dred Scott.
29 Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control of Florida et al. 350 U.S. 413 (1956).
30 N.Y. Times, February 3, 1974, at 54.
31 See EDMONDS, JUDICIAL ASSuMPTIONS ON THE VALUE OF INTEGRATED EDUCATION
FOR BLACKS, PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE ON EDUCATION FOR BLACKS
(1972); The Value of Integrated Education, in THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH CONTROVERSY 562.
CONST. Amend. IV.
Jones v. U.S., 357 U.S. 493, 497 (1958).
3 U.S. v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
'U.S.
2
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able search. In its recent holding in U.S. v. Robinson4 the court stated:
"The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover
evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was
the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or
evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being
lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the
authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
but also is a
'reasonable' search under that amendment. ' 5
In order to fully understand the decision of the court it is important
to review the facts leading up to this Supreme Court decision. Willie
Robinson was arrested in the District of Columbia for operating a motor
vehicle after revocation of his license. A District of Columbia police
officer made a complete field search of the defendant at the scene of the
arrest and discovered fourteen capsules of heroin in a crumpled cigarette
package located in .the defendant's coat pocket. The officer did not indicate any subjective fear of the defendant, did not suspect Mr. Robinson
was armed, and was not specifically looking for weapons or anything else
6
in the search.
Mr. Robinson was convicted of a narcotics offense in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia but on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia removed the case for an evidentiary hearing
concerning the scope of the search of the defendant's person at the time
7
of his arrest for a traffic offense.
The legality of the search was upheld by the District Court, but the
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the heroin had been obtained
as the result of a search violative of the Fourth Amendment. Even though
the defendant had been lawfully placed in custodial arrest, the search
could not have produced further evidence of the crime of driving after
revocation of one's permit. Thus, the search should have been limited to a
search of defendant's outer clothing to discover weapons, similar to a stop
and frisk weapon search incident to an investigative stop based on less
8
than probable cause.
In addition to reaching its decision which reversed the holding of the
Court of Appeals the Supreme Court went on to explain why the evidence
4 U.S. v. Robinson, -U.S.94 S.Ct. 467 (1973).
' Id. at 477.
6 Id. at 477.
7Id. at 467.
8 U.S. v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082 (1972).
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was properly admitted. It stated that it was not important that the arresting
officer did not indicate any subjective fear of the defendant or that he did
not himself suspect that the defendant was armed. 9 The court reasoned
that while making a lawful search the officer came upon a package of
cigarettes and was entitled to inspect it; and when his inspection revealed
heroin capsules he was entitled to seize them as fruits, instrumentalities
or contraband probative of criminal conduct. 10
After making this final statement the Court cites Harris v. United
States," Warden v. Hayden12 and Adams v. Williams,'3 it is conceded

that the courts here used such language in ruling the evidence obtained
upon the search not related to the original arrest was admissible, but in
all of these cases the search was made contemporaneously with, or after
an arrest involving a weapon or serious crime. There was a reasonable
belief that due to the nature of the offense further weapons might be involved giving the officer the right to search.
In light of this holding the court has determined that a citizen is subject
to a full search of his person in any situation that involves a custodial
arrest. This avenue of thought seems to be side stepping prior decisions
of the Court.14 It should also be noted that in making its decision the court
stated, "Virtually all of the statements of this Court affirming the existence
of an unqualified authority to search incident to a lawful arrest are dicta."' 5
After examining the development of early case law on the subject
of search incident to arrest there is little doubt that such search is valid
insofar as its purpose is to discover "fruits, implements or evidence"
of the crime for which the arrest is made. Therefore, it is the connection
between the object sought and the nature of the crime which makes the
search reasonable rather than the mere fact of a lawful arrest.' 6
The right to search incident to a lawful arrest was discussed in Preston
v. US. 1 7 The Court stated that the rule allowing contemporaneous
searches incident to lawful arrest is justified by the need to seize weapons
and other things which might be used to assault the police officer or effect
an escape as well as the need to secure and prevent the destruction of
evidence of the crime.
I U.S. v. Robinson, -U.S.10Id. at 477.

94 S.Ct. 467, 477 N.7 (1973).

11Id., 331 U.S. 145, 154-155 (1947).
12

Id., 387 U.S. 294, 299, 307 (1967).

13 Id.,

407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972).

,4See, e.g. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47, n.6 (1970), Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969), Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. I, 19-20 (1968), Peters v. New York,
392 U.S. at 66, 67 (1968).
In all of the cases cited the Court has laid tenets for the justification for a search incident to arrest. The justification was not based solely on the arrest, but rather the protection
of the officer and evidence or in the Chambers case, the circumstances of the arrest.
s Id. at 474.
16 69 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 868.
'r Preston v. U.S., 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
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In U.S. v. Humphrey 8 the court took note that a warrantless search
based on probable cause was reasonable only when it was not feasible to
obtain a search warrant or unless the search was incident to a legal arrest. It
continued by saying that the exceptions are not based on anything inherent
in the exception itself but result from the inductive case by case application
of the constitutional standard of reasonableness. These exceptions have
been traditionally justified by the need to protect the arresting officer,
prevent escape, collect instrumentalities or fruits of the crime and prevent
delay which might otherwise permit the criminal to escape or commit
his crime. "From this rationale it is clear that the scope of a search
contemporaneous with a legal arrest must have a reasonable relationship
to the protection of the officer or the crime for which the accused was
arrested."'"
It is evident from the language that the court has premised its justification of a search incident to arrest on the need to protect the officer and
preserve evidence. Reasoning such as this gives adequate basis for allowing
a search without a warrant. Police officers should be allowed to protect
themselves and obtain evidence of the crime involved. Few will quarrel
with any attempt by the courts to safeguard police officers' rights in such
cases.
The discussion of the Court of Appeals in Robinson exemplified
the fact that the officer made no suggestion that he believed what he found
in the pocket was a weapon nor did he believe he was in danger. The officer
admitted that he did not have any specific purpose in mind when he searched
the defendant. Absent these factors the court refused to sanction a search
into the pockets of the defendant which produced evidence which led to
20
a conviction of a crime unrelated to the original arrest.
Some courts have gone even further than the Court of Appeals in
condemning searches incident to a lawful arrest for a mere motor vehicle
regulation. They have held that absent "special circumstances" a police
21
officer has no right to search either the arrestee or the motor vehicle.
The Supreme Court's position that the lawful arrest establishes the
right to search disagrees with the Court of Appeals which suggests that
there be litigated in each case the issue of whether or not there was present
one of the factors supporting the authority for a search of the person incident
to a lawful arrest.
The current position taken by the Court also conflicts with its reasoning
in Sibron v. U.S. where the court said, "The constitutional validity of
a warrantless search is preeminently the sort of question which can only
U.S. v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055 (1969).
19 Id. at 1058.
20 U.S. v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1089 (1972).
21 Stidham v. Wingo, 452 F.2d 837 (1971); U.S. v. Davis, 441 F.2d 28 (1971); Barrentine
v. U.S. 434 F.2d 636 (1970).
22 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968).
IS
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be decided in the concrete factual context of the individual case." 2 2
The dissent written by Mr. Justice Marshall accuses the majority of
turning its back on the principles which the Court has followed in the
past. By ruling that the fact of the lawful arrest always establishes the
authority to conduct a full search of the arrestee's person the Court has
abrogated the holding in Go-Bart Co. v. U.S. 23 where the Court examined
the Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness stating, "There is
no formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be
decided on its own facts and circumstances."
While the Court has ruled that an arrest may not be used as a pretext
to search for evidence, 24 this might be the unfortunate offspring of the
effects of Robinson will be felt in the
Court's decision. The far-reaching
25
near future if not already.
CONCLUSION

The result of the Supreme Court's decision cannot help but create a
visceral reaction. It does not take a legal scholar to find fault with a ruling
that will allow citizens, who may be guilty of a minor traffic offense, to
be subjected to a full search by some over zealous police officer. Where
does a person's right to privacy begin? Where is the line of demarcation
drawn between the legitimate interests of society and the rights of a
citizen to be protected against such intrusions? Would it be permissible
for the arresting officer to search a man's wallet or a lady's pocketbook
while making an arrest for going through a red light? After reading the
Court's interpretation of the right to search this might be possible.
ROBERT C. WILLIAMS

Corporal Punishment in the Schools: Ware v. Estes
A somewhat innovative approach to the limitation, if not the abatement,
of corporal punishment in the public schools was initiated by a group of
23 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
24

U.S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).

25 See also, Gustafson v. Florida 94 S.Ct. 488 (1973). Defendant was convicted of un-

lawful possession of marihuana. At his trial the state introduced into evidence marihuana
which had been seized from him during a search incident to his arrest on a charge of driving
without an operator's license. The arresting officer did not indicate any subjective fear
of defendant nor did he suspect that the defendant was armed. The District Court of Appeals
of Florida, Fourth District reversed the conviction, holding that the search which led to the
discovery of' the marihuana was unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Gustafson v. State, 243 So. 2d 615 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971). The Supreme Court of Florida
reversed, 258 So. 2d I (Fla, 1972). The Supreme Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Florida
citing U.S. v. Robinson.
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